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Sergio Cesaratto
Posted
together with a commentary in the article Guido Montani "We will do as Schroeder" by Sergio Cesaratto and a replica of the latter.
In his contribution Montani said that "Europe suffers from a serious institutional imbalance," denounced "European federalists," where "has been created only monetary pillar." Expected to be a place like Germany, but not too much, when it disappears, "the distinction between strong and weak countries" This suggests that a (reinforced) the European Parliament and the Commission to have "a budget of at least 3 5 to 4.5% of GDP. " To go to meet the "Good causes" Germany believes that it would be "to support some of the constraints of austerity ... to prevent international finance endanger the monetary union, and to sustain due to" pride "the alternative project, the progressive parties "should take" serious measures ... to reduce public debt. "Although, finally," no shared theoretical criteria for determining when a debt becomes sustainable ... these criteria are in practice and made explicit by the financial speculative attacks in countries like Spain and Ireland that also met the Maastricht criteria.
Article Montani expresses a common sense and rigorous-European broadcast on Italian and European left. While acknowledging some plot points - notably the idea of \u200b\u200ba larger European budget - do not hide a fundamental disagreement in the formulation and content.
a) First, the European institutional structure is not a random result, but arises from the idea that markets liberalized goods and labor, accompanied by a monetary policy inherited from the Bundesbank and the waiver policy tax would ensure non-inflationary growth. This model has been good for the German economic model and have accentuated imbalances in Europe, as explained many times in this magazine.
b) This structure is ideally modified, albeit in a more complex indicates Montani, this implies, in particular, the renunciation by Germany of certain features of their own economic constitution. The political realism on the German economic constitution leads us to be pessimistic in this respect [1].
c) Montani, paradoxically, seems more optimistic about the Germanization of Europe ("In fact, the German government is becoming the EU government. If in the future we will proceed in this direction is to build a German Europe ") but rejects it as not a "good solution for Europe's citizens." Indeed, if things were that simple, all European citizens accept some sacrifices in order to resemble that country! Unfortunately, however, the performance of German behavior through massive doses of deflation is a mission impossible : most efficient companies can only be achieved in a context of growth and not a progressive impoverishment of the population. Moreover, as noted sharply , the obsession in the recovery of national competitiveness as a solution to the problems of the euro, shared Merkel and the Commission shows that "are trying to push the euro area, as if it were a small island off shore.")
d) Montani seems to subscribe to the thesis that an alternative, that even require the repayment of debt for the peripheral countries (does not seem worthy of discussion of the idea that this is national pride.) The concept of sustainability is arbitrary, since Montani admitted as argued in the appeal economists in the stabilization of public debt. [2] The public debt sustainability depends of course on monetary policy adopted. If it is accommodated in the sense to minimize the burden of debt sustainability is guaranteed. The ECB has a great opportunity to do that, if European governments wanted (unfortunately, seem to allow banks to what is considered anathema to the public sector). [3] Why then impose on indebted countries deflationary fiscal policies that only worsen the national situation, the EU and the world, as alleged in the letter economists [4] measures, however, doomed to failure as Montani admitted that the Greek case.
What to do? Meanwhile, back away from the federalist utopia - which find their basis in the same ideology laissez-faire as it is directed to European aid - for a realistic view of relations between countries and the complex relationship between the distributive conflict and international economic agreements. On this basis, economic projects proposed as an alternative to the existing design is an instrument of political struggle as long as you do not believe the solution lies in what they call Keynesian idealism (although Montani sometimes seems far away yet that), remember that the rejection of Keynesianism is Article 1 of the German economic constitution. Faced with economic conflicts have deep historical roots, there are no easy solutions and the only rule is to confront this reality nacionales.Spinelli aware of the interests not, please.
[1] You can see the critical positions Carlo Panico, somehow similar to Montana, Cesaratto .
[2] that the debt of some countries of the periphery is under attack, under the Maastricht criteria do not prove anything, since in these countries is the private system that heavily indebted, with the possibility of worsening public finances.
[3] Unfortunately Montani in its wider contribution to the referring fully agrees with the current status of the ECB un "pilar sólido", argumentando que la austeridad fiscal es "necesaria para evitar una nueva crisis," una posición que está en consonancia con la "contracción fiscal expansionista" de Alesina .
[4] La carta de fecha 15 de junio de 2010 fue dirigida al presidente Napolitano. Se supo que unos pocos días después de que el presidente dijo: "El tema, sin embargo, está obligando a preocupaciones centrales compartidas por una gran parte de la comunidad internacional - junto con el de la realización concreta de los objetivos adecuados de la consolidación de los presupuestos públicos - la cuestión de la recuperación del contexto de crecimiento económico. The two points are combined formulations in all of the latest documents, mainly the European Union, the second can not be neglected over the first, but the combination is controversial and difficult. It also depends on the contribution that the European recovery is still weak that will be given by some of the major EU economies, if we do not care about finances and strengthening the competitiveness of the country, and depend on a combination of positive consolidation Financial and economic growth, the specific content of the stabilization operation in countries like ours. "
Original: Economy and Politics
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